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April 19, 2025
April 19, 2025

 

Case Study Six: The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

On Monday, April 5, 2010, just before 3:00 in the afternoon, miners at Massey Energy Corporation’s Upper Big Branch coal mine in southern West Virginia were in the process of a routine shift change. Workers on the evening shift were climbing aboard “mantrips,” low-slung electric railcars that would carry them into the sprawling, three-mile-wide drift mine, cut horizontally into the side of a mountain. Many day shift workers inside the mine had begun packing up and were preparing to leave, and some were already on their way to the portals. At one of the mine’s main “longwalls,” one thousand feet below the surface, a team of four highly experienced miners was operating a shearer, a massive machine that cut coal from the face with huge rotating blades. The shearer had been shut down for part of the day because of mechanical difficulties, and the miners were making one last pass before the evening shift arrived to take their places.

 

Big Branch Mine Disaster

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Suddenly, a spark thrown off as the shearer’s blades cut into hard sandstone ignited a small pocket of flammable methane gas. One of the operators immediately switched off the high-voltage power to the machine. Seconds later, the flame reached a larger pocket of methane, creating a small fireball. Apparently recognizing the danger, the four miners on the longwall crew began running for the exit opposite the fire. They had traveled no more than 400 feet when coal dust on the ground and in the air ignited violently, setting off a wave of powerful explosions that raced through the mine’s seven miles of underground tunnels. When it was over three minutes later, 29 miners (including all four members of the longwall crew) were dead, and two were seriously injured. Some had died from injuries caused by the blast itself, others from carbon monoxide suffocation as the explosion sucked the oxygen out of the mine. It was the worse mining disaster in the United States in almost 40 years.

 

An evening shift miner who had just entered the mine and boarded a mantrip for the ride to the coal face later told investigators what he had experienced:

 

All of a sudden you heard this big roar, and that’s when the air picked up. I’d say it was probably 60-some miles per hour. Instantly black. It took my hardhat and ripped it off my head, it was so powerful.

 

This miner and the rest of his group abandoned the mantrip and ran for the entrance, clutching each other in the darkness. On the outside, stunned and shaken, they turned to the most senior member of their crew for an explanation. “Boys …, I’ve been in the mines a long time,” the veteran miner said “That [was] no [roof] fall…. The place blew up.”1

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

(page 489)

 

Massey Energy Corporation

At the time of the explosion, Massey Energy Corporation, the owner and operator of the Upper Big Branch mine, was one of the leading coal producers in the United States. The company, which specialized in the production of high-grade metallurgical coal, described itself as “the most enduring and successful coal company in central Appalachia,” where it owned one-third of the known coal reserves. Massey extracted 37 million tons of coal a year, ranking it sixth among U.S. producers in tonnage. The company sold its coal to more than a hundred utility, metallurgical, and industrial customers (mostly on long-term contracts) and exported to 13 countries. In 2009, Massey earned $227 million on revenue of $2.7 billion. The company and its subsidiaries employed 5,800 people in 42 underground and 14 surface mines and several coal processing facilities in West Virginia, Kentucky, and Virginia.

 

Massey maintained that it brought many benefits to the nation as a whole and to the Appalachian region. The coal industry in the United States, of which Massey was an important part, provided the fuel for about half of the electricity generated in the United States, lessening the country’s reliance on imported oil. The company provided thousands of relatively well-paying jobs in a region that had long been marked by poverty and unemployment. Economists estimated that for every job in the coal industry, around three and a half jobs were created elsewhere. The company donated to scholarship programs, partnered with local schools, and provided emergency support during natural disasters, such as severe flooding in West Virginia in May 2009. “We recognize that it takes healthy and viable communities for our company to continue to grow and succeed,” Massey declared in its 2009 report to shareholders.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

But critics saw a darker side of Massey. The company was one of the leading practitioners of mountaintop removal mining, in which explosives were used to blast away the tops of mountains to expose valuable seams of coal. The resulting waste was frequently dumped into adjacent valleys, polluting streams, harming wildlife, and contaminating drinking water. In 2008, Massey paid $20 million to resolve violations of the Clean Water Act, the largest-ever settlement under that law. In an earlier incident, toxic mine sludge spilled from an impoundment operated by the company in Martin County, Kentucky, contaminating hundreds of miles of the Big Sandy and Ohio rivers, necessitating a $50 million cleanup. Worker safety was also a concern. An independent study found that Massey had the worst fatality rate of any coal company in the United States. For example, in the decade leading up to the Upper Big Branch disaster, Peabody Coal (the industry leader in tons produced) had one fatality for every 296 million tons of coal mined; Massey’s rate was one fatality per 18 million tons—more than 16 times as high.

 

Donald L. Blankenship

At the time of the Upper Big Branch mine disaster, the chief executive officer and undisputed boss of Massey Energy was Don Blankenship. A descendant of the McCoy family of the famous warring clans the Hatfields and the McCoys, Blankenship was raised by a single mother in a trailer in Delorme, a railroad depot in the coalfields of West Virginia. His mother supported the family by working 6 days a week, 16 hours a day, running a convenience store and gas station. Michael Shnayerson, who wrote about Blankenship in his book, Coal River, reported that the executive had absorbed from his mother the value of hard work—as well as contempt for others who might be less fortunate. “Anyone who didn’t work as hard as she did deserved to fail,” Shnayerson wrote. “Sympathy appeared to play no part in her reckonings.”2

 

(page 490)

 

Blankenship graduated from Marshall University in Huntington, West Virginia, with a degree in accounting. As a college student, he worked briefly in a coal mine to earn money for tuition. In 1982, at age 32, he returned to the coalfields to join Massey Energy, taking a job as an office manager for a subsidiary called Rawls. Soon after, Massey announced it intended to spin off its subsidiaries as separate companies and re-open them as nonunion operations. The United Mine Workers, the union that then represented many Massey workers, struck the company. Jeff Goodell, a journalist who profiled Blankenship in Rolling Stone, described the young manager’s technique for defeating the union at Rawls:

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Blankenship erected two miles of chain link fence around the facility, brought in dogs and armed guards, and ferried nonunion workers through the union’s blockades. The strike, which lasted more than a year, grew increasingly violent—strikers took up baseball bats against the workers trying to take their jobs, and a few even fired shots at the scabs. A volley of bullets zinged into Blankenship’s office and smashed into an old TV…. For years afterward, Blankenship kept the TV with a bullet hole through it in his office as a souvenir.3

 

The union’s defeat at Massey (by 2010, only about 1 percent of Massey’s workers were union members, all of them in coal preparation plants rather than mines) contributed to the overall decline of the United Mine Workers in the coalfields. In the 1960s, unions represented nearly 90 percent of the nation’s mine workers; by 2010, they represented just 19 percent.

 

Blankenship quickly moved through the management ranks. In 1990, only eight years after he joined the company, he became president and chief operating officer of the Massey Coal Company and in 1992 was promoted to CEO and chairman. (The company was renamed Massey Energy in 2000 when it separated from its parent, Fluor Corp.) By some measures, he was a successful CEO. Between 2001, the first full year of Massey’s in-dependent operation, and 2009, annual revenue increased from $1.2 billion to $2.7 billion. During this period, employment rose from around 3,700 to 5,800. Blankenship more than doubled the company’s coal reserves, mainly through acquisitions of smaller firms. Massey shareholders, like all investors, were buffeted by the extreme volatility of the stock market during the 2000s. Nevertheless, an investor who purchased $10,000 worth of Massey stock in December 2004 would have a holding valued at $12,800 in December 2010—a rate of return close to that of the coal industry as a whole during this period.4

 

As CEO, Blankenship developed a reputation as a hands-on, detail-oriented manager. He lived in the coalfields and ran the company out of a double-wide trailer in Belfry, Kentucky, just over the West Virginia line. He signed off on all hires, all the way down to janitors. One manager expressed amazement when he learned that the CEO would have to approve a tankful of gasoline for his truck. Managers were required to fax production figures to Blankenship every half hour. Red phones connected mine managers directly to the CEO. “If the report was late or the numbers weren’t good, or the mine was shut down for any reason,” Shnayerson reported, “the red phone would ring. The terrified manager would pick it up to hear Mr. B demanding to know why the numbers weren’t right.”5 Blankenship told an interviewer, “People talk about character being what you do when no one else is looking. But the truth of the matter is character is doing that which is unpopular if it’s right, even if it causes you to be vilified.”6

 

(page 491)

 

As CEO, Blankenship maintained a laser focus on productivity. In 2005, he sent a memo titled “RUNNING COAL” to all Massey underground mine superintendents that stated:

 

If any of you have been asked by your group presidents, your supervisors, engineers, or anyone else to do anything other than run coal (i.e., build overcasts, do construction jobs, or whatever) you need to ignore them and run coal. This memo is necessary only because we seem not to understand that coal pays the bills.

 

A week later, after this memo had been widely circulated, he followed up with another one which referred to the company’s S-1, P-2 (safety first, production second) program. He wrote: “By now each of you should know that safety and S-1 is our first responsibility. Productivity and P-2 are second.”

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Executive Compensation

Blankenship was well compensated for running Massey. As shown in Exhibit A, his total compensation in 2009 was almost $18 million; this was up from $11 million in 2008 and $9 million in 2007. Blankenship’s base salary in all three years was close to $1 million. By far the greatest proportion of his total pay came from a performance-based incentive system established by Massey’s board of directors. In its filings with the SEC, the board described its philosophy of compensation this way:7

 

We compensate our named executive officers in a manner that is meant to attract and retain highly qualified and gifted individuals and to appropriately incentivize and motivate the named executive officers to achieve continuous improvements in company-wide performance for the benefit of our stockholders.8

 

Exhibit A Don Blankenship, Total Compensation 2007–2009, in Dollars

 

Note: “Other” includes personal use of company cars, aircraft (Challenger 601 corporate jet), housing, and related costs and services.

 

Source: Massey Energy 2010 Proxy, “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” and “Compensation of Named Executive Officers.”

 

(page 492)

 

Accordingly, the compensation committee of the board established an incentive plan for Massey’s CEO. (Similar plans were in place for other senior executives as well.) The plan set specific performance measures for “areas over which Mr. Blankenship was responsible and positioned to directly influence outcome.” These areas, and the proportion of his incentive compensation based on them, are shown in Exhibit B.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Exhibit B Incentive Compensation Plan for Massey Energy’s CEO, 2009

The calculation of incentive plan compensation was based on achievement of specific targets in these areas:

 

EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) -15%

Produced tons – 15%

Continuous miner productivity (feet/shift) – 5%

Surface mining productivity (tons/man-hour) – 5%

Environmental violations (% reduction) – 10%

Fulfillment of contracts – 15%

Nonfatal days lost due to injury and accident (% reduction) – 10%

Identification of successor – 5%

Employee retention – 15%

Diversity of members – 5%

 

Source: Massey Energy 2010 Proxy.

Note: A “continuous miner” is a large machine that extracts coal underground.

 

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

 

By one estimate, in the 10 years leading up to the disaster Blankenship received a total of $129 million in compensation from Massey.9 “I don’t care what people think,” he once said during a talk to a gathering of Republican Party leaders in West Virginia, speaking of himself in the third person. “At the end of the day, Don Blankenship is going to die with more money than he needs.”10

 

Government Regulation of Mining Safety and Health

Coal mining had always been a hazardous occupation. Methane gas, an odorless and colorless by-product of decomposing organic matter that was often present alongside coal, was highly flammable. Methane explosions had contributed to the deaths of more than 10,000 miners in the United States since 1920. To mine safely, methane levels had to be constantly monitored, and ventilation systems had to be effective enough to remove it from the mine. Coal dust itself—whether on the floor or other surfaces, or suspended in the air—was also highly flammable. The standard practice was to apply layers of rock dust (crushed limestone) over the coal dust to render it inert. In addition to the ever-present danger of fire, miners had long contended with the threat of collapsing roofs and walls, dangerous mechanical equipment, and suffocation. Miners often developed coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, commonly called black lung, a chronic, irreversible disease caused by breathing coal dust. (Black lung was preventable with proper coal dust control.)

 

(page 493)

 

Health and safety in the mining industry had long been regulated at both the federal and state levels. Over the years, lawmakers have periodically strengthened government regulatory control, mostly in response to mining disasters.

 

· In 1910, following an explosion at the Monongah mine in West Virginia in which 362 men died, Congress established the U.S. Bureau of Mines to conduct research on the safety and health of miners.

 

· The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, known as the Coal Act—which passed in 1969 after the death of 78 miners at the Consol Number 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia—greatly increased federal enforcement powers. This law established fines for violations and criminal penalties for “knowing and willful” violations. It also provided compensation for miners disabled by black lung disease.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

· The 1977 Mine Act further strengthened the rights of miners and established the Mine Safety and Health Administration, MSHA (pronounced “Em-shah”) to carry out its regulatory mandates. The law required at least four full inspections of underground mines annually.

 

· Then in 2006, after yet another string of mine tragedies focused public attention on the dangers of mining, Congress passed the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act, known at the MINER Act. This law created new rules to help miners survive underground explosions and accidents.11

States like West Virginia that had significant mining industries also had their own regulatory rules and agencies.

Although MSHA was empowered to inspect mines unannounced and to fine operators for violations, the agency had limited authority to shut down a mine if a serious problem was present or if the operator refused to pay its fines. Criminal violations of mine safety laws were normally considered misdemeanors rather than felonies.

 

Over time, fatalities in the industry had declined. At the turn of the 20th century, around 300 to 400 miners died every year in the nation’s coal mines; by the 1980s, this number had dropped to less than 50. Injuries and illnesses had also dropped. In part, these declines reflected tougher government regulations. They also reflected the rise of surface mining (mostly in the western United States), which tended to be safer, and the emergence of new technologies that mechanized the process of underground mining. The unionization of the mining industry had also given workers a greater voice and the right to elect safety representatives in many workplaces.

 

The Upper Big Branch Mine

Massey had bought the Upper Big Branch mine in 1993 from Peabody Coal. It was a particularly valuable property because its thick coal seam produced the high-grade metallurgic coal favored by utilities and the steel industry. Two hundred employees worked there on three, round-the-clock shifts. In 2009, Upper Big Branch produced 1.2 million tons of coal, about 3 percent of Massey’s total. The mine, like all of those operated by Massey, was nonunion.

 

The regulatory record revealed a widespread pattern of safety violations at the Upper Big Branch mine and an increasingly contentious relationship between its managers and government regulators. As shown in Exhibit C, government inspectors had issued an increasing number of violations over time, with a sharp spike upward the year before the disaster. These page 494data also showed that around 2006, management had begun to contest regulatory penalties rather than pay them. The state investigation reported the story that at one point Massey’s vice president for safety—an attorney—“took a violation written by an inspector, looked at her people, and said, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll litigate it away.’” Appealing the citations not only allowed the company to delay or avoid paying; it also blocked tougher sanctions, such as shutting down the mine.

 

Exhibit C: Safety and Health Citations, Upper Big Branch Mine, Assessed Penalties and Amount Paid, 2000–2009

Source: MSHA data, reported in the appendices of Industrial Homicide: Report on the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster.

Miners testified that they were intimidated or disciplined if they complained about safety. When one foreman told his men not to run coal until a ventilation problem was fixed, he was suspended for three days for “poor work performance.” Another miner, who was killed in the blast, had told his wife that a manager had told him when he complained about conditions, “If you can’t go up there and run coal, just bring your [lunch] bucket outside and go home.” The father of a young miner who was still a trainee when he was killed at Upper Big Branch related his son’s experience to investigators. The young man had told his father that when he had expressed concerns about safety to his supervisor, he was told, “If you’re going to be that scared of your job here, you need to rethink your career.”12 Miners who were hurt on the job were told not to report their injuries, so an NFDL (non-fatal day lost) would not be recorded. A former Massey miner who testified before a Senate committee explained, “If you got hurt, you were told not to fill out the lost-time accident paperwork. The company would just pay guys to sit in the bathhouse or to stay at home if they got hurt.”13

Investigators found that the company had kept two sets of books at UBB, one for its own record keeping and the other to show inspectors. “If a coal mine wants to keep two sets of books, that’s their business,” the administrator for MSHA later commented. “They can keep five sets of books if they want. But they’re required to record the hazards in the official set of books.”14 Conditions that were recorded in the company’s own books—but not the official set—included sudden methane spikes, inoperative safety equipment, and other dangers.

 

(page 495)

 

The mine also had a system in place, set up by its chief of security, to warn underground managers that an inspector was on the way—a clear violation of the law. A miner who survived the explosion later told Congress, “The code word would go out we’ve got a man [government inspector] on the property…. When the word goes out, all effort is made to correct the deficiencies.”15 A surviving miner testified:

 

Nobody shuts one of Don Blankenship’s mines down. It has never happened. Everyone knows when mine inspectors are coming, you clean things up for a few minutes, make it look good, then you go back to the business of running coal. That’s how things work at Massey. When inspectors write a violation, the company lawyers challenge it in court. It’s just all a game. Don Blankenship does what he wants.16

 

After the disaster, Blankenship stated, “Violations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process. There are violations in every coal mine in America, and UBB was a mine that had violations.”

 

Causes of the Disaster

In the months following the tragedy at Upper Big Branch, three separate investigations—conducted by the federal MSHA, a commission established by the governor of West Virginia, and the United Mine Workers—examined the causes of the fatal explosion. All came to the same conclusion: that a spark from the longwall shearer had ignited a pocket of methane, which had then set off a series of explosions of volatile coal dust that had raced through the mine. Such events could only have happened in the presence of serious, systematic safety violations. Among the problems cited by the investigators were these:

 

· Rock Dust. Investigators found that the company had failed to meet government standards for the application of rock dust. As a result, explosive coal dust had built up on surfaces and in the air throughout the mine.

 

The state commission reported that the Upper Big Branch mine had only two workers assigned to rock dusting, and they typically worked at the task only three days a week and were frequently called away to do other jobs. Moreover, their task was often impossible because the mine’s single dusting machine, which was about 30 years old, was broken most of the time. Federal investigators later determined that more than 90 percent of the area of the mine where the explosion occurred was inadequately rock dusted at the time of the explosion. They also found that the area of the longwall where the explosion began had not been rock dusted a single time since production started there in September 2009. The presence of large amounts of floating coal dust in the mine was also suggested by medical evidence. Seventy-one percent of the autopsied victims showed clinical signs of black lung disease, caused by breathing airborne coal dust. Nationally, the rate of black lung disease in underground coal miners was around 3 percent.

 

· Ventilation. Investigators found that the Upper Big Branch Mine did not have sufficient ventilation to provide the miners with fresh, breathable air, and to remove coal dust as well as methane and other dangerous gases.

Upper Big Branch, like many mines, used a so-called push-pull system in which large fans at the portal blew fresh air into the mine, and a fan on the other end pulled air out. The state page 496investigation found that this system did not work very well at Upper Big Branch. The fans were powerful enough, but the plan was not properly engineered.

 

The push-pull ventilation system at Upper Big Branch … had a design flaw: its fans were configured so that air was directed in a straight line even though miners worked in areas away from the horizontal path. As a result, air had to be diverted from its natural flow pattern into the working sections…. Because these sections were located on different sides of the natural flow pattern, multiple diversionary controls had to be constructed and frequently were in competition with one another.17

 

Poor ventilation had likely caused methane to build up near the longwall shearer, providing the fuel for the initial fireball, investigators found.

 

· Equipment Maintenance. Investigators concluded that water sprays on the longwall shearer were not functioning properly, and as a result were unable to extinguish the initial spark.

 

After the disaster, investigators closely studied the longwall shearer where the initial fire had started. They found that several of the cutting teeth on the rotating blades (called “bits”) had worn flat and lost their carbide tips, so they were likely to create sparks when hitting sandstone. The investigators also examined the water nozzles on the shearer, which normally sprayed water onto the coal face during operation to cool the cutting bits, extinguish sparks, and push away any methane that might have leaked into the area. They found that seven of the nozzles were either missing or clogged. Tests found that the longwall shearer did not have adequate water pressure to keep the surface wet and cool. As a result, any small sparks thrown off during the mining process could not be extinguished.

 

In short, a series of interrelated safety violations had combined to produce a preventable tragedy. The United Mine Workers called the disaster “industrial homicide” and called for the criminal prosecution of Massey’s managers.

 

For its part, Massey had a completely different interpretation of the causes of the events of April 5. An investigation commissioned by the company and headed by Bobby R. Inman, its lead independent director, said that the explosion was caused by a sudden, massive inundation of natural gas through a crack in the mine’s floor—an Act of God that the company could not have anticipated or prevented. The company report stated:

 

… the scientific data that [Massey] has painstakingly assembled over the last year with the assistance of a team of nationally renowned experts so far compels at least five conclusions. First, a massive inundation of natural gas caused the UBB explosion and coal dust did not contribute materially to the magnitude or severity of the blast; second, although an ignition source may never be determined, the explosion likely originated in the Tailgate 21 entries, but certainly not as a result of faulty shearer maintenance; third, [the company] adequately rock dusted the mine prior to the explosion such that coal dust could not have played a causal role in the accident; fourth, the mine’s underground ventilation system provided significantly more fresh air than required by law and there is no evidence that ventilation contributed to the explosion; and fifth, MSHA has conducted a deeply flawed accident investigation that has been predicated, in part, upon secrecy, protecting its own self-interest, witness intimidation, obstruction of [company] investigators, and retaliatory citations.18

 

In a conversation with stock analysts six months after the disaster, Blankenship stated that he had a “totally clear conscience” and that he did not believe Massey had “contributed in any way to the accident.”19

 

Discussion Questions

 

1) What were the costs and benefits to stakeholders of the actions taken by Massey Energy and its managers?,

 

2) Applying the four methods of ethical reasoning (utilitarianism rights justice and virtue do you believe Massey Energy behaved in an ethical manner?, Why or why not?,

 

3) Who or what caused the Upper Big Branch mine disaster and why do you think so?,

 

4) Who or what caused the Upper Big Branch mine disaster and why do you think so?,

Reference:

Lawrence, A., & Weber, J. (2022). Business and Society (17th ed.). McGraw-Hill Higher

Education (US). https://reader2.yuzu.com/books/9781265914769

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April 18, 2025
April 18, 2025

Case Study Six: The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

On Monday, April 5, 2010, just before 3:00 in the afternoon, miners at Massey Energy Corporation’s Upper Big Branch coal mine in southern West Virginia were in the process of a routine shift change. Workers on the evening shift were climbing aboard “mantrips,” low-slung electric railcars that would carry them into the sprawling, three-mile-wide drift mine, cut horizontally into the side of a mountain. Many day shift workers inside the mine had begun packing up and were preparing to leave, and some were already on their way to the portals. At one of the mine’s main “longwalls,” one thousand feet below the surface, a team of four highly experienced miners was operating a shearer, a massive machine that cut coal from the face with huge rotating blades. The shearer had been shut down for part of the day because of mechanical difficulties, and the miners were making one last pass before the evening shift arrived to take their places.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Suddenly, a spark thrown off as the shearer’s blades cut into hard sandstone ignited a small pocket of flammable methane gas. One of the operators immediately switched off the high-voltage power to the machine. Seconds later, the flame reached a larger pocket of methane, creating a small fireball. Apparently recognizing the danger, the four miners on the longwall crew began running for the exit opposite the fire. They had traveled no more than 400 feet when coal dust on the ground and in the air ignited violently, setting off a wave of powerful explosions that raced through the mine’s seven miles of underground tunnels. When it was over three minutes later, 29 miners (including all four members of the longwall crew) were dead, and two were seriously injured. Some had died from injuries caused by the blast itself, others from carbon monoxide suffocation as the explosion sucked the oxygen out of the mine. It was the worse mining disaster in the United States in almost 40 years.

 

An evening shift miner who had just entered the mine and boarded a mantrip for the ride to the coal face later told investigators what he had experienced:

 

All of a sudden you heard this big roar, and that’s when the air picked up. I’d say it was probably 60-some miles per hour. Instantly black. It took my hardhat and ripped it off my head, it was so powerful.

 

This miner and the rest of his group abandoned the mantrip and ran for the entrance, clutching each other in the darkness. On the outside, stunned and shaken, they turned to the most senior member of their crew for an explanation. “Boys …, I’ve been in the mines a long time,” the veteran miner said “That [was] no [roof] fall…. The place blew up.”1

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

(page 489)

 

Massey Energy Corporation

At the time of the explosion, Massey Energy Corporation, the owner and operator of the Upper Big Branch mine, was one of the leading coal producers in the United States. The company, which specialized in the production of high-grade metallurgical coal, described itself as “the most enduring and successful coal company in central Appalachia,” where it owned one-third of the known coal reserves. Massey extracted 37 million tons of coal a year, ranking it sixth among U.S. producers in tonnage. The company sold its coal to more than a hundred utility, metallurgical, and industrial customers (mostly on long-term contracts) and exported to 13 countries. In 2009, Massey earned $227 million on revenue of $2.7 billion. The company and its subsidiaries employed 5,800 people in 42 underground and 14 surface mines and several coal processing facilities in West Virginia, Kentucky, and Virginia.

 

Massey maintained that it brought many benefits to the nation as a whole and to the Appalachian region. The coal industry in the United States, of which Massey was an important part, provided the fuel for about half of the electricity generated in the United States, lessening the country’s reliance on imported oil. The company provided thousands of relatively well-paying jobs in a region that had long been marked by poverty and unemployment. Economists estimated that for every job in the coal industry, around three and a half jobs were created elsewhere. The company donated to scholarship programs, partnered with local schools, and provided emergency support during natural disasters, such as severe flooding in West Virginia in May 2009. “We recognize that it takes healthy and viable communities for our company to continue to grow and succeed,” Massey declared in its 2009 report to shareholders.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

But critics saw a darker side of Massey. The company was one of the leading practitioners of mountaintop removal mining, in which explosives were used to blast away the tops of mountains to expose valuable seams of coal. The resulting waste was frequently dumped into adjacent valleys, polluting streams, harming wildlife, and contaminating drinking water. In 2008, Massey paid $20 million to resolve violations of the Clean Water Act, the largest-ever settlement under that law. In an earlier incident, toxic mine sludge spilled from an impoundment operated by the company in Martin County, Kentucky, contaminating hundreds of miles of the Big Sandy and Ohio rivers, necessitating a $50 million cleanup. Worker safety was also a concern. An independent study found that Massey had the worst fatality rate of any coal company in the United States. For example, in the decade leading up to the Upper Big Branch disaster, Peabody Coal (the industry leader in tons produced) had one fatality for every 296 million tons of coal mined; Massey’s rate was one fatality per 18 million tons—more than 16 times as high.

 

Donald L. Blankenship

At the time of the Upper Big Branch mine disaster, the chief executive officer and undisputed boss of Massey Energy was Don Blankenship. A descendant of the McCoy family of the famous warring clans the Hatfields and the McCoys, Blankenship was raised by a single mother in a trailer in Delorme, a railroad depot in the coalfields of West Virginia. His mother supported the family by working 6 days a week, 16 hours a day, running a convenience store and gas station. Michael Shnayerson, who wrote about Blankenship in his book, Coal River, reported that the executive had absorbed from his mother the value of hard work—as well as contempt for others who might be less fortunate. “Anyone who didn’t work as hard as she did deserved to fail,” Shnayerson wrote. “Sympathy appeared to play no part in her reckonings.”2

 

(page 490)

 

Blankenship graduated from Marshall University in Huntington, West Virginia, with a degree in accounting. As a college student, he worked briefly in a coal mine to earn money for tuition. In 1982, at age 32, he returned to the coalfields to join Massey Energy, taking a job as an office manager for a subsidiary called Rawls. Soon after, Massey announced it intended to spin off its subsidiaries as separate companies and re-open them as nonunion operations. The United Mine Workers, the union that then represented many Massey workers, struck the company. Jeff Goodell, a journalist who profiled Blankenship in Rolling Stone, described the young manager’s technique for defeating the union at Rawls:

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Blankenship erected two miles of chain link fence around the facility, brought in dogs and armed guards, and ferried nonunion workers through the union’s blockades. The strike, which lasted more than a year, grew increasingly violent—strikers took up baseball bats against the workers trying to take their jobs, and a few even fired shots at the scabs. A volley of bullets zinged into Blankenship’s office and smashed into an old TV…. For years afterward, Blankenship kept the TV with a bullet hole through it in his office as a souvenir.3

 

The union’s defeat at Massey (by 2010, only about 1 percent of Massey’s workers were union members, all of them in coal preparation plants rather than mines) contributed to the overall decline of the United Mine Workers in the coalfields. In the 1960s, unions represented nearly 90 percent of the nation’s mine workers; by 2010, they represented just 19 percent.

 

Blankenship quickly moved through the management ranks. In 1990, only eight years after he joined the company, he became president and chief operating officer of the Massey Coal Company and in 1992 was promoted to CEO and chairman. (The company was renamed Massey Energy in 2000 when it separated from its parent, Fluor Corp.) By some measures, he was a successful CEO. Between 2001, the first full year of Massey’s in-dependent operation, and 2009, annual revenue increased from $1.2 billion to $2.7 billion. During this period, employment rose from around 3,700 to 5,800. Blankenship more than doubled the company’s coal reserves, mainly through acquisitions of smaller firms. Massey shareholders, like all investors, were buffeted by the extreme volatility of the stock market during the 2000s. Nevertheless, an investor who purchased $10,000 worth of Massey stock in December 2004 would have a holding valued at $12,800 in December 2010—a rate of return close to that of the coal industry as a whole during this period.4

 

As CEO, Blankenship developed a reputation as a hands-on, detail-oriented manager. He lived in the coalfields and ran the company out of a double-wide trailer in Belfry, Kentucky, just over the West Virginia line. He signed off on all hires, all the way down to janitors. One manager expressed amazement when he learned that the CEO would have to approve a tankful of gasoline for his truck. Managers were required to fax production figures to Blankenship every half hour. Red phones connected mine managers directly to the CEO. “If the report was late or the numbers weren’t good, or the mine was shut down for any reason,” Shnayerson reported, “the red phone would ring. The terrified manager would pick it up to hear Mr. B demanding to know why the numbers weren’t right.”5 Blankenship told an interviewer, “People talk about character being what you do when no one else is looking. But the truth of the matter is character is doing that which is unpopular if it’s right, even if it causes you to be vilified.”6

 

(page 491)

 

As CEO, Blankenship maintained a laser focus on productivity. In 2005, he sent a memo titled “RUNNING COAL” to all Massey underground mine superintendents that stated:

 

If any of you have been asked by your group presidents, your supervisors, engineers, or anyone else to do anything other than run coal (i.e., build overcasts, do construction jobs, or whatever) you need to ignore them and run coal. This memo is necessary only because we seem not to understand that coal pays the bills.

 

A week later, after this memo had been widely circulated, he followed up with another one which referred to the company’s S-1, P-2 (safety first, production second) program. He wrote: “By now each of you should know that safety and S-1 is our first responsibility. Productivity and P-2 are second.”

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Executive Compensation

Blankenship was well compensated for running Massey. As shown in Exhibit A, his total compensation in 2009 was almost $18 million; this was up from $11 million in 2008 and $9 million in 2007. Blankenship’s base salary in all three years was close to $1 million. By far the greatest proportion of his total pay came from a performance-based incentive system established by Massey’s board of directors. In its filings with the SEC, the board described its philosophy of compensation this way:7

 

We compensate our named executive officers in a manner that is meant to attract and retain highly qualified and gifted individuals and to appropriately incentivize and motivate the named executive officers to achieve continuous improvements in company-wide performance for the benefit of our stockholders.8

Exhibit A Don Blankenship, Total Compensation 2007–2009, in Dollars

Note: “Other” includes personal use of company cars, aircraft (Challenger 601 corporate jet), housing, and related costs and services.

 

Source: Massey Energy 2010 Proxy, “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” and “Compensation of Named Executive Officers.”

 

(page 492)

 

Accordingly, the compensation committee of the board established an incentive plan for Massey’s CEO. (Similar plans were in place for other senior executives as well.) The plan set specific performance measures for “areas over which Mr. Blankenship was responsible and positioned to directly influence outcome.” These areas, and the proportion of his incentive compensation based on them, are shown in Exhibit B.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

 

Exhibit B Incentive Compensation Plan for Massey Energy’s CEO, 2009

The calculation of incentive plan compensation was based on achievement of specific targets in these areas:

 

EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) -15%

Produced tons – 15%

Continuous miner productivity (feet/shift) – 5%

Surface mining productivity (tons/man-hour) – 5%

Environmental violations (% reduction) – 10%

Fulfillment of contracts – 15%

Nonfatal days lost due to injury and accident (% reduction) – 10%

Identification of successor – 5%

Employee retention – 15%

Diversity of members – 5%

Source: Massey Energy 2010 Proxy.

Note: A “continuous miner” is a large machine that extracts coal underground.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

By one estimate, in the 10 years leading up to the disaster Blankenship received a total of $129 million in compensation from Massey.9 “I don’t care what people think,” he once said during a talk to a gathering of Republican Party leaders in West Virginia, speaking of himself in the third person. “At the end of the day, Don Blankenship is going to die with more money than he needs.”10

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

Government Regulation of Mining Safety and Health

Coal mining had always been a hazardous occupation. Methane gas, an odorless and colorless by-product of decomposing organic matter that was often present alongside coal, was highly flammable. Methane explosions had contributed to the deaths of more than 10,000 miners in the United States since 1920. To mine safely, methane levels had to be constantly monitored, and ventilation systems had to be effective enough to remove it from the mine. Coal dust itself—whether on the floor or other surfaces, or suspended in the air—was also highly flammable. The standard practice was to apply layers of rock dust (crushed limestone) over the coal dust to render it inert. In addition to the ever-present danger of fire, miners had long contended with the threat of collapsing roofs and walls, dangerous mechanical equipment, and suffocation. Miners often developed coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, commonly called black lung, a chronic, irreversible disease caused by breathing coal dust. (Black lung was preventable with proper coal dust control.)

 

(page 493)

 

Health and safety in the mining industry had long been regulated at both the federal and state levels. Over the years, lawmakers have periodically strengthened government regulatory control, mostly in response to mining disasters.

· In 1910, following an explosion at the Monongah mine in West Virginia in which 362 men died, Congress established the U.S. Bureau of Mines to conduct research on the safety and health of miners.

· The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, known as the Coal Act—which passed in 1969 after the death of 78 miners at the Consol Number 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia—greatly increased federal enforcement powers. This law established fines for violations and criminal penalties for “knowing and willful” violations. It also provided compensation for miners disabled by black lung disease.

The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster

· The 1977 Mine Act further strengthened the rights of miners and established the Mine Safety and Health Administration, MSHA (pronounced “Em-shah”) to carry out its regulatory mandates. The law required at least four full inspections of underground mines annually.

· Then in 2006, after yet another string of mine tragedies focused public attention on the dangers of mining, Congress passed the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act, known at the MINER Act. This law created new rules to help miners survive underground explosions and accidents.11

States like West Virginia that had significant mining industries also had their own regulatory rules and agencies.

Although MSHA was empowered to inspect mines unannounced and to fine operators for violations, the agency had limited authority to shut down a mine if a serious problem was present or if the operator refused to pay its fines. Criminal violations of mine safety laws were normally considered misdemeanors rather than felonies.

Over time, fatalities in the industry had declined. At the turn of the 20th century, around 300 to 400 miners died every year in the nation’s coal mines; by the 1980s, this number had dropped to less than 50. Injuries and illnesses had also dropped. In part, these declines reflected tougher government regulations. They also reflected the rise of surface mining (mostly in the western United States), which tended to be safer, and the emergence of new technologies that mechanized the process of underground mining. The unionization of the mining industry had also given workers a greater voice and the right to elect safety representatives in many workplaces.

The Upper Big Branch Mine

Massey had bought the Upper Big Branch mine in 1993 from Peabody Coal. It was a particularly valuable property because its thick coal seam produced the high-grade metallurgic coal favored by utilities and the steel industry. Two hundred employees worked there on three, round-the-clock shifts. In 2009, Upper Big Branch produced 1.2 million tons of coal, about 3 percent of Massey’s total. The mine, like all of those operated by Massey, was nonunion.

The regulatory record revealed a widespread pattern of safety violations at the Upper Big Branch mine and an increasingly contentious relationship between its managers and government regulators. As shown in Exhibit C, government inspectors had issued an increasing number of violations over time, with a sharp spike upward the year before the disaster. These page 494data also showed that around 2006, management had begun to contest regulatory penalties rather than pay them. The state investigation reported the story that at one point Massey’s vice president for safety—an attorney—“took a violation written by an inspector, looked at her people, and said, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll litigate it away.’” Appealing the citations not only allowed the company to delay or avoid paying; it also blocked tougher sanctions, such as shutting down the mine.

Exhibit C: Safety and Health Citations, Upper Big Branch Mine, Assessed Penalties and Amount Paid, 2000–2009

Source: MSHA data, reported in the appendices of Industrial Homicide: Report on the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster.

Miners testified that they were intimidated or disciplined if they complained about safety. When one foreman told his men not to run coal until a ventilation problem was fixed, he was suspended for three days for “poor work performance.” Another miner, who was killed in the blast, had told his wife that a manager had told him when he complained about conditions, “If you can’t go up there and run coal, just bring your [lunch] bucket outside and go home.” The father of a young miner who was still a trainee when he was killed at Upper Big Branch related his son’s experience to investigators. The young man had told his father that when he had expressed concerns about safety to his supervisor, he was told, “If you’re going to be that scared of your job here, you need to rethink your career.”12 Miners who were hurt on the job were told not to report their injuries, so an NFDL (non-fatal day lost) would not be recorded. A former Massey miner who testified before a Senate committee explained, “If you got hurt, you were told not to fill out the lost-time accident paperwork. The company would just pay guys to sit in the bathhouse or to stay at home if they got hurt.”13

Investigators found that the company had kept two sets of books at UBB, one for its own record keeping and the other to show inspectors. “If a coal mine wants to keep two sets of books, that’s their business,” the administrator for MSHA later commented. “They can keep five sets of books if they want. But they’re required to record the hazards in the official set of books.”14 Conditions that were recorded in the company’s own books—but not the official set—included sudden methane spikes, inoperative safety equipment, and other dangers.

 

(page 495)

 

The Upper Big Branch Mine

The mine also had a system in place, set up by its chief of security, to warn underground managers that an inspector was on the way—a clear violation of the law. A miner who survived the explosion later told Congress, “The code word would go out we’ve got a man [government inspector] on the property…. When the word goes out, all effort is made to correct the deficiencies.”15 A surviving miner testified:

 

Nobody shuts one of Don Blankenship’s mines down. It has never happened. Everyone knows when mine inspectors are coming, you clean things up for a few minutes, make it look good, then you go back to the business of running coal. That’s how things work at Massey. When inspectors write a violation, the company lawyers challenge it in court. It’s just all a game. Don Blankenship does what he wants.16

 

After the disaster, Blankenship stated, “Violations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process. There are violations in every coal mine in America, and UBB was a mine that had violations.”

 

Causes of the Disaster

In the months following the tragedy at Upper Big Branch, three separate investigations—conducted by the federal MSHA, a commission established by the governor of West Virginia, and the United Mine Workers—examined the causes of the fatal explosion. All came to the same conclusion: that a spark from the longwall shearer had ignited a pocket of methane, which had then set off a series of explosions of volatile coal dust that had raced through the mine. Such events could only have happened in the presence of serious, systematic safety violations. Among the problems cited by the investigators were these:

 

· Rock Dust. Investigators found that the company had failed to meet government standards for the application of rock dust. As a result, explosive coal dust had built up on surfaces and in the air throughout the mine.

 

The state commission reported that the Upper Big Branch mine had only two workers assigned to rock dusting, and they typically worked at the task only three days a week and were frequently called away to do other jobs. Moreover, their task was often impossible because the mine’s single dusting machine, which was about 30 years old, was broken most of the time. Federal investigators later determined that more than 90 percent of the area of the mine where the explosion occurred was inadequately rock dusted at the time of the explosion. They also found that the area of the longwall where the explosion began had not been rock dusted a single time since production started there in September 2009. The presence of large amounts of floating coal dust in the mine was also suggested by medical evidence. Seventy-one percent of the autopsied victims showed clinical signs of black lung disease, caused by breathing airborne coal dust. Nationally, the rate of black lung disease in underground coal miners was around 3 percent.

 

· Ventilation. Investigators found that the Upper Big Branch Mine did not have sufficient ventilation to provide the miners with fresh, breathable air, and to remove coal dust as well as methane and other dangerous gases.

Upper Big Branch, like many mines, used a so-called push-pull system in which large fans at the portal blew fresh air into the mine, and a fan on the other end pulled air out. The state page 496investigation found that this system did not work very well at Upper Big Branch. The fans were powerful enough, but the plan was not properly engineered.

 

The push-pull ventilation system at Upper Big Branch … had a design flaw: its fans were configured so that air was directed in a straight line even though miners worked in areas away from the horizontal path. As a result, air had to be diverted from its natural flow pattern into the working sections…. Because these sections were located on different sides of the natural flow pattern, multiple diversionary controls had to be constructed and frequently were in competition with one another.17

 

Poor ventilation had likely caused methane to build up near the longwall shearer, providing the fuel for the initial fireball, investigators found.

 

· Equipment Maintenance. Investigators concluded that water sprays on the longwall shearer were not functioning properly, and as a result were unable to extinguish the initial spark.

 

After the disaster, investigators closely studied the longwall shearer where the initial fire had started. They found that several of the cutting teeth on the rotating blades (called “bits”) had worn flat and lost their carbide tips, so they were likely to create sparks when hitting sandstone. The investigators also examined the water nozzles on the shearer, which normally sprayed water onto the coal face during operation to cool the cutting bits, extinguish sparks, and push away any methane that might have leaked into the area. They found that seven of the nozzles were either missing or clogged. Tests found that the longwall shearer did not have adequate water pressure to keep the surface wet and cool. As a result, any small sparks thrown off during the mining process could not be extinguished.

 

In short, a series of interrelated safety violations had combined to produce a preventable tragedy. The United Mine Workers called the disaster “industrial homicide” and called for the criminal prosecution of Massey’s managers.

 

For its part, Massey had a completely different interpretation of the causes of the events of April 5. An investigation commissioned by the company and headed by Bobby R. Inman, its lead independent director, said that the explosion was caused by a sudden, massive inundation of natural gas through a crack in the mine’s floor—an Act of God that the company could not have anticipated or prevented. The company report stated:

 

… the scientific data that [Massey] has painstakingly assembled over the last year with the assistance of a team of nationally renowned experts so far compels at least five conclusions. First, a massive inundation of natural gas caused the UBB explosion and coal dust did not contribute materially to the magnitude or severity of the blast; second, although an ignition source may never be determined, the explosion likely originated in the Tailgate 21 entries, but certainly not as a result of faulty shearer maintenance; third, [the company] adequately rock dusted the mine prior to the explosion such that coal dust could not have played a causal role in the accident; fourth, the mine’s underground ventilation system provided significantly more fresh air than required by law and there is no evidence that ventilation contributed to the explosion; and fifth, MSHA has conducted a deeply flawed accident investigation that has been predicated, in part, upon secrecy, protecting its own self-interest, witness intimidation, obstruction of [company] investigators, and retaliatory citations.18

 

In a conversation with stock analysts six months after the disaster, Blankenship stated that he had a “totally clear conscience” and that he did not believe Massey had “contributed in any way to the accident.”19

 

The Upper Big Branch Mine

Discussion Questions

 

1) What were the costs and benefits to stakeholders of the actions taken by Massey Energy and its managers?,

 

2) Applying the four methods of ethical reasoning (utilitarianism rights justice and virtue do you believe Massey Energy behaved in an ethical manner?, Why or why not?,

 

3) Who or what caused the Upper Big Branch mine disaster and why do you think so?,

 

4) Who or what caused the Upper Big Branch mine disaster and why do you think so?,

 

 

Reference:

 

Lawrence, A., & Weber, J. (2022). Business and Society (17th ed.). McGraw-Hill Higher

Education (US). https://reader2.yuzu.com/books/9781265914769

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March 16, 2025
March 16, 2025

Nursing Job

Assignment Instructions

To complete the assignment, follow this required format:

Title Page

Please include a title page in APA format. You can find the guidelines using Academic Writer or the Library and APA Resources tab.

 

Nursing Job

 

Part 1: Salary Research

Research several potential job roles in your desired geographical area. Provide a summary of your research including the location of the job, job title, and salary information. To research your starting salary, consider using the information provided at Salary.com and Payscale.com.

Local government hospitals may also publish this information on their websites. You should find a minimum of two sources that contain salaries to compare to help you make a judgment about a reasonable starting average salary for this position.

Consider degrees, certifications, and the number of years of experience that you have when determining what positions, you qualify for and what your salary may be.

You must include in-text citations using APA format when comparing your salaries.

Nursing Job

Part 2: Calculations and Table of Expenses

After you have found your potential salary, set up your monthly budget using only 2/3 income to account for taxes and other deductions (called your net salary). You need to include your work for your calculations.

For example, if you anticipate making $45,000/year, then 2/3

times 45,000 = 30,000. $30,000 / 12 = $2500 and that is

what you want to use for setting up a monthly budget.

Use the table provided to fill in your monthly budget. You may add any extra categories/rows to the table needed to complete your budget.

When creating your budget, be sure to consider the following categories:

  • Housing and living expenses (e.g., rent/mortgage, utilities, maintenance, etc.)
  • Food
  • Student loan payments
  • Transportation
  • Childcare (if applicable)
  • Credit Card or other debt
  • Car loans
  • Continuous medical expenses
  • Emergency savings
  • Retirement savings
  • Long term goal savings (e.g., buying a home, new car, education, etc.)
  • Discretionary spending (e.g., eating out, entertainment, etc)

The total amount and net amount will be included in your table so you can see your balance each month. The table must be copied into your Word document. Please refer to the video directions provided in the module.

Nursing Job

Part 3: Graphical Representation of Your Budget

Display your table of expenses as a graphical representation.

You may choose to use a pie chart or bar graph to represent your expenses. The table and graphical representation must be copied into your Word document. Do not submit an Excel file. Please refer to the video directions provided in the module.

Part 4: Reflection

In this reflection, you should reflect on your findings. This reflection section should be a minimum of 200 words.

Please address the following prompts in your reflection:

  • Why did you pick this location and job?,
  • Were you surprised by your expected salary and income after taxes and other deductions were taken?,
  • Why or why not?,
  • What were some challenges in creating your budget?,
    What surprised you?,
  • Were you able to set up an emergency/savings fund?,
    Why or why not?,
  • How can you prepare for unexpected expenses?,
  • How can you apply these budgeting tools to your current situation?

Be sure to put in-text citations in APA format. Academic Writer is the recommended guide for formatting resources.

Part 5: References

All references should be in APA format. Academic Writer is the recommended guide for formatting resources. There should be a minimum of two references.

January 7, 2025
January 7, 2025

Protecting Human Research Participants

Review the Frequently Asked Questions on Requirements for Education at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) : https://humansubjects.nih.gov/requirement-education

Protecting Human Research Participants

Read the detailed document by the NIH:

https://grants.nih.gov/sites/default/files/PHRP_Archived_Course_Materials_English.pdf

Reflect on what you learned from the NIH materials about protecting the rights of human research participants.

Discuss at least two of the following:

  • Describe the circumstances that influenced the need for a policy to protect human research subjects., Give examples of specific ways human research subjects can be harmed by researchers., Protecting Human Research Participants
  • Identify three vulnerable populations and the special restrictions associated with human research among these groups., Evaluate the requirements and restrictions., Do you think they are adequate?, Why or why not?,
  • The Belmont Report summarizes the ethical principles and guidelines for research involving human subjects. Three core principles are identified: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Even though these principles are considered equal, prioritize them in order of importance to you. Explain your decisions.
  • Although you are not implementing a change project at this time, and you may not be directly involved in research as part of your professional responsibilities, explain the reasons why it is important for you to know about these rights and protections.

Your reflection should be two pages and written in current APA Style. Protecting Human Research Participants

Review the Frequently Asked Questions on Requirements for Education at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) : https://humansubjects.nih.gov/requirement-education

Read the detailed document by the NIH: Protecting Human Research Participants

https://grants.nih.gov/sites/default/files/PHRP_Archived_Course_Materials_English.pdf

Reflect on what you learned from the NIH materials about protecting the rights of human research participants.

Discuss at least two of the following:

  • Describe the circumstances that influenced the need for a policy to protect human research subjects. Give examples of specific ways human research subjects can be harmed by researchers.
  • Identify three vulnerable populations and the special restrictions associated with human research among these groups. Evaluate the requirements and restrictions. Do you think they are adequate? Why or why not?
  • The Belmont Report summarizes the ethical principles and guidelines for research involving human subjects. Three core principles are identified: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Even though these principles are considered equal, prioritize them in order of importance to you. Explain your decisions.
  • Although you are not implementing a change project at this time, and you may not be directly involved in research as part of your professional responsibilities, explain the reasons why it is important for you to know about these rights and protections.

Your reflection should be two pages and written in current APA Style.

October 8, 2024
October 8, 2024

Case Study Jenkins Goes Abroad

Jenkins Consulting is a national firm that helps companies improve their performance and effectiveness by advising on all aspects of business management and operations. Companies hire consultants from Jenkins Consulting for a variety of projects such as assisting with company-wide cost reduction initiatives or revenue growth initiatives, improving supply-chain management, and/or improving individual departments such as information technology. Jenkins employs consultants in 200 offices across the United States and will soon expand its operations internationally.

 

Case Study Jenkins Goes Abroad

A company located in the United Kingdom has hired Jenkins for a major project that will be based at the company’s headquarters in London. Jenkins will assist the company with an organization-wide effort to restructure and reposition the company to succeed in a more competitive market. To complete this project, Jenkins will assign five full-time consultants for a period of approximately two years. Because of the significant time commitment, Jenkins has decided to relocate the selected consultants to the United Kingdom for the duration of the project. Case Study Jenkins Goes Abroad

Dale Kugar, the human resource director at Jenkins, must prepare to transition the consultants to the new assignment. This is the company’s first exposure to expatriate management, and Dale needs to ensure that the consultants who move to the United Kingdom for the project are compensated appropriately. His intention is to have the consultants maintain their current benefits, including health care insurance, retirement savings, and paid time off. However, he must make a recommendation on any changes to each consultant’s salary.

Dale has a few concerns as he prepares his recommendation. First, the United Kingdom is currently experiencing a high level of inflation. The value of the American dollar compared to the British pound is low. That is, the consultant’s U.S. salary will not have the same purchasing power in the United Kingdom as it does at home. He is also concerned about the consultants’ interest in taking on the international assignment. Some of the consultants he spoke to about the assignment are concerned about the impact the assignment will have on their career. Because this is Jenkins’ first international experience, the consultants are concerned that being out of the country for two years may affect their future career opportunities because they will not have regular interactions with the firm partners who make decisions on promotions. These concerns weigh heavily on Dale’s mind as he starts to draft his recommendation.Case Study Jenkins Goes Abroad

 Please answer the following questions regarding the above case study.

  1. 13-6. How should Dale approach the determination of the consultant’s salaries as expatriates?,
  2. 13-7. Should Jenkins offer any incentive compensation or additional benefits to the expatriates?, Why or why not?,

Please cite textbook author : Martocchio, J. (2020). Strategic Compensation: A Human Resource Management Approach (10th ed.) Pearson. and outside sources.,

 This is a Turnitin.com assisgnment.

October 7, 2024
October 7, 2024

Disinformation Campaign

Right now, Haitians are being vilified in the American media as a result of being recruited to live in Springfield, Ohio and experiencing a widespread disinformation campaign about their impact on Americans. What are some of the ways Haitians have had to combat negative stereotypes in the past? Does the world owe anything to Haiti, and if so, how should Haiti and Haitians be treated?

 

Disinformation Campaign

Q2

Choose a radioactive element, either one from the list below or one that you know about otherwise and report out on it. try to choose one that no one else has chosen. Tell us things such as the chemical formula for it such as PL 239. What is it u…

Choose a radioactive element, either one from the list below or one that you know about otherwise, and report out on it. try to choose one that no one else has chosen. Tell us things such as the chemical formula for it such as PL 239. What is it used for in everyday life. Where might it be found, what does it primary emit (ie Alpha, beta, Gamma, Neutrons,x rays), Half life (how long does it stay around, How do we protect ourselves from it. Disinformation Campaign

Some radioactive elements you may want to look at are

Radium

Ra

Uranium

U

Thorium

Th

Radon

Rn

Polonium

Po

Plutonium

Pu

Technetium

Tc

Americium

Am

Bismuth

Bi

Neptunium

Np

Promethium

Pm

Curium

Cm

Californium

Cf

 

Q3 Neva

Which historical event do you think had the most substantial impact on the art of the 18th century in Europe and the Americas? How did this event reshape or influence the visual arts?  Disinformation CampaignYou may choose a work of sculpture, painting, or architecture, but you must make sure you explain your choice. Support your discussion with fully identified visual evidence (images).  Make sure that the images are inserted in your response. Images should be visible in the post and not need to be downloaded!

 

Q4 Tina

What was the Pax Augusta (Augustan Peace)? How was it presented in art? Select a work of art produced during the rule of Augusts and explain how it promotes the Roman Imperial agenda?  You may choose a work of sculpture or architecture, but you must make sure you explain your choice. Support your discussion with fully identified visual evidence (images),  Make sure that the images are inserted in your response. Images should be visible in the post and not need to be downloaded! Disinformation Campaign

Q5 mika

Most employers tout being an “Equal Opportunity Employer.” In America, we promote both multiculturalism and diversity, but may not fully understand the differences. While multiculturalism may be great when thinking about cuisine and festivals, present an argument that some cultural practices should not be embraced for America to maintain its identity. Also, does it not make more sense to recognize diversity and promote a “fair” opportunity rather than an equal one?

Q6

why be moral? In the long run, does it matter how you justify your actions if you are “following the rules”?

Finally, considering just the theories you encountered in the week 1 Reading & Resources (*Kantian Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Virtue), which seems more compatible with your disposition? Be sure to provide detailed answers.

Q7

In Week 3, we used crosstabs to determine if a potential relationship between two variables is worth examining further. During Week 4, we studied tests of significance. In this week’s discussion, students will apply these tests of significance to their project variables. As we discussed previously, the level of measurement of our variables determine which test of significance works for the research project. Disinformation Campaign

Complete the following steps:

  1. Post a brief explanation of your topic. Include your research question. Next, begin your 5 steps of hypothesis testing by stating your research and null hypotheses. State your alpha level is .05.
  2. Run a test of significance on your variables (based on the level of measurement).  Copy and paste the appropriate table into the window.
  3. Identify the two-tailed p value and explain your findings. Is p<alpha? Do you reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis? Does your IV affect your DV?

As a reminder, here is the guideline for tests of significance:

  1. IV and DV are BOTH categorical variables (nominal/ordinal): Chi-square
  2. IV and DV are both interval/ratio variables: Regression
  3. IV is categorical (nominal/ordinal) and DV is interval/ratio:
  4. IV has 2 values/groups: Independent Sample T-test
  5. IV has 3 or more values/groups: ANOVA

Why do we need to run tests of significance?

  1. They allow us to see if our relationship is “statistically significant.” To be more specific, these tests tell us if a relationship observed in a sample, like our research project based on GSS 2018 data set, is generalizable to the population from which this sample was drawn (US adults).
  2. Test results reported under “p” in the SPSS output tell us the probability or likelihood that a relationship observed in the sample is not real, but rather due to factors like a sampling error or chance. We compare this “chance” with alpha (level of significance), commonly set as .05 or .01. If this chance is smaller than level of significance (p<alpha), we can reject the null hypothesis, and keep the research hypothesis. The smaller the p, the lower the possibility for error.

Q8

What is the nature and scope of the alcohol and/or drug abuse problem in the United States today? For example, is this problem more significant today than it was in the past? Include current data (no more than 36 months old) and the reference to support whether rates have decreased or increased over time.

 

Q9

  1. As children transition into the stage of adulthood, discuss what it means to be an adult?
  2. Explain how work for the parent impacts the relationship within the family? How do parents balance the responsibility of work and home? Support your writing with facts and information.  Your post cannot be solely opinion.

Q10

Now that you are most of the way through this course on foodsafety, list something that you used to believe regarding foodsafety that you learned was actually a myth. Include a link to a valid source that dispels this myth. Or, if you cannot come up with an example, comment on a foodsafety violation that you think is fairly common and can cause illness. Include a link to a valid source that supports the fact this is a violation of food safety.Disinformation Campaign

 

Q11

Part 2:

  1. Complete the attached Par-Q+ form.  Download ParQ+ Here
  2. Describe the process of completing your PAR-Q+ form.
  3. Notify your instructor via email, if you answered YES, to any of the questions.

Part 3:

  1. How do the seven, NASPE Core Responsibilities promote athlete centered strength, conditioning, and performance enhancement?
  2. As a strength, conditioning, and performance enhancement coach why is it important to design and implement training programs with the athlete as the primary stakeholder?
    1. Do the NSCA and the NASM codes of ethical conduct support your rationale?
    2. Why? Why, not?

Q12

Describe the difference between direct and indirect costs, and list some examples of each.  What data sources would you use in estimating the project budget?  Defend one of the five cost-estimating techniques.

Q13

discuss the evolution of criminal investigations, starting from ‘Locard’s Exchange Principle’ in Forensic Science and extending to today’s use of artificial intelligence. In doing so, briefly share what you consider effective police investigative practices, beginning with the officer and detective’s arrival at the crime scene.

Q15 Evans

The long run phenomena of economies of scale describes as the reduction in long-run average cost and hence, in efficiency sourced to increase in firm’s scale of operation.  Discuss whether long-term phenomena of economies of scale have any relevance to Walmart

Q16

  • What does Intelligence Interrogation mean to you?

    2) How would you describe the impact of US interrogation policy on international terrorism?

Q17

Part 2: The best way to learn statistics is to do statistics. At one point, most of us have needed to purchase a vehicle. At the very least, it’s fun to look at them! Go to the Kelley Blue Book website or any other vehicle website and choose 10 different vehicles. These can be ones you would consider buying or even your total dream car. Record the following information in a blank Excel file.

Save your Excel, for future discussions, and then upload the Excel as an attachment in your intro. discussion for review.

Vehicle type/class Year Make Model Price    MPG (city)     MPG (highway)
Example:            
SUV    2018   Subaru      Forester       $22,795 23 29

Explain the type(s) of vehicles you chose and provide a brief rationale for your choice. For each column category, state whether the variable is qualitative or quantitative. Last, add a new column with a variable of your choice and state whether it is qualitative or quantitative. You might consider engine size, number of cylinders, vehicle weight, or drive type.

Once you have posted your initial discussion, you must reply to at least two other learner’s post. Each post must be a different topic. So, you will have your initial post from one topic, your first follow-up post from a different topic, and your second follow-up post from one of the other topics. Of course, you are more than welcome to respond to more than two learners.”

 

Q18

Summarize the complexities faced by law enforcement personnel when seeking assistance for stress-related issues.  There are many complexities but consider personnel equity and diversity in providing assistance to gender, race, age, rank, duties, and other related matters.

Q19

One administrative role that’s rarely discussed is that of the court administrator. A court administrator manages the daily operations of a federal, state, or local courthouse. Standard job duties include, but are not limited to, acting as the court liaison, managing the court’s budget, and having oversight over most court employees.

What role does the court administrator serve in keeping the court calendar from being bottlenecked? In other words, how do court administrators keep the daily court docket flowing without overwhelming the judges and without violating the rights of the accused?

Q20

Background: You are a Health Information Management (HIM) professional working in a public health agency. The agency is responsible for monitoring and responding to public health threats, including bioterrorism, communicable disease outbreaks, and emerging infectious diseases. The agency recognizes the need for a robust biosurveillance system to enhance early detection and response capabilities. As part of the agency’s efforts, you have been assigned to lead the development of a biosurveillance registry.

Case Scenario:

Your public health agency has identified a potential bioterrorism threat in the community. The agency’s medical director has requested the establishment of a biosurveillance registry to track potential cases and provide timely information for response and mitigation efforts. Your role as the HIM professional is crucial in defining the registry and ensuring the effective management of data.

Discussion Questions:

  1. Define the key data elements for the biosurveillance registry:
    • Identify the specific data elements that should be included in the biosurveillance registry to track potential bioterrorism cases.
    • Discuss the challenges and considerations in determining the necessary data elements, such as patient demographics, symptoms, exposure history, laboratory test results, and relevant geographic information.
  2. Discuss the role of HIM in establishing the biosurveillance registry:
    • Discuss how HIM professionals can contribute their expertise in data management, coding, and information governance to ensure the accuracy, integrity, and confidentiality of data within the biosurveillance registry.
    • Explain the importance of standardized terminologies and coding systems in facilitating data interoperability and information exchange between healthcare entities and public health agencies.
  3. Analyze the potential benefits of the biosurveillance registry:
    • Discuss how the biosurveillance registry can support evidence-based decision-making, resource allocation, and public health interventions to mitigate the impact of bioterrorism and infectious diseases.
  4. Address privacy and security considerations in the biosurveillance registry:
    • Discuss the privacy and security measures that should be implemented to protect the sensitive health information collected in the biosurveillance registry.
  1. Reflect on the challenges and opportunities in implementing the biosurveillanc registry:
      • Discuss strategies and best practices for overcoming these challenges and maximizing the effectiveness of the biosurveillance system in your public health agency.

Q21

Select one(1) article from the following online journal links:  
American Journal of Epidemiology: http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/
The Journal of Infectious Diseases: http://jid.oxfordjournals.org/
Journal of Public Health: http://jpubhealth.oxfordjournals.org/
Clinical Infectious Diseases: http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/ 

You must read the full article (not just the abstract).  You may need to visit the APUS library to access the full article.  Full articles within the last year may not be available.  

After reading your selected article, post the following information:

  1. Identify the disease that is being studied and what type of prevention method is being evaluated (i.e. primary secondary or tertiary).,
  2. Describe what the prevention method is.  It could be a new screening method vaccination drugs or other intervention.,
  3. Who was in the study population(s)/sample(s)?,
  4. What was the conclusion of the study?,
  5. Do you believe the study to  be reliable and valid?,  Why or why not?,
  6. What recommendation(s) did the researcher offer for future studies? ,

Q22

http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=616240

Please answer both of the following Discussion Questions:

  1. What impact does the changing nature of crime have on criminology? Please be sure to provide at least one real life example to help illustrate/support your comments.

    2. Going beyond the weekly readings, and supporting your comments with a real life example, how does (or can) criminological research impact social policy?

Q23

Go to the “Humans of New York” websiteInstragram page, or Facebook page and browse several narratives of people featured. Explore one social problem individuals have discussed as part of their narratives and discuss the following question:

Apply one of the major Sociological Theories outlined in this week’s lesson (Structural functionalism, Social Conflict, or Symbolic Interaction) to help understand the social problem discussed in the Humans of New York narrative you chose (Part 2 will comprise the remaining 200 or more words for your initial post).

Q24

  Read the entries in the section “Why Write?” which is linked here. The link opens on the first section, called “Self-Expression and Self-Enrichment.”  Please be sure to read all five (5) sections. Then respond to the following questions. Why do you write? What kind of writing do you typically do now?  What kind of writing would you like to do?

  When you write something, you assume a specific identity as a writer, much like the role of a character. You might assume different identities writing as a student, employee, family member, or friend. Describe some of the character roles you assume in your current writing. Include traits of each role that distinguish it from others.

Q25 J Felton

Share your thoughts about how we create an online community.

  • What key elements do you think supports our ability to build an effective learning community (CO7)?
  • Share your ideas, perspectives and thoughts. How can we use this platform to evolve as learners?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

September 2, 2024
September 2, 2024

Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University 95 F.Supp.3d 1101 (2015),The case summary omits the discussion of whether Ms. Pambianchi was discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation because in March 2015, sexual orientation was not projected by Title VII., Note that sexual orientation was deemed protected by Title VII in July 2015., Do you think Ms. Pambianchi would have had a stronger case if she had argued after the law was changed?, Why or Why not?,

2. This case was filed using Title VII, but presents many other legal issues. What specifically about the facts of this case do you think might be the basis for legal challenges? Explain your reasoning.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arkansas/aredce/4:2013cv00046/92274/60/Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University

Pambianchi v. Arkansas

 

Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University  95 F.Supp.3d 1101 (2015) Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University

  1. The case summary omits the discussion of whether Ms. Pambianchi was discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation because in March 2015, sexual orientation was not projected by Title VII. Note that sexual orientation was deemed protected by Title VII in July 2015. Do you think Ms. Pambianchi would have had a stronger case if she had argued after the law was changed? Why or Why not?

2. This case was filed using Title VII, but presents many other legal issues. What specifically about the facts of this case do you think might be the basis for legal challenges? Explain your reasoning.Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arkansas/aredce/4:2013cv00046/92274/60/

Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University 95 F.Supp.3d 1101 (2015) Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech University

  1. The case summary omits the discussion of whether Ms. Pambianchi was discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation because in March 2015, sexual orientation was not projected by Title VII. Note that sexual orientation was deemed protected by Title VII in July 2015. Do you think Ms. Pambianchi would have had a stronger case if she had argued after the law was changed? Why or Why not?

2. This case was filed using Title VII, but presents many other legal issues. What specifically about the facts of this case do you think might be the basis for legal challenges? Explain your reasoning.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arkansas/aredce/4:2013cv00046/92274/60/